Voluntary amalgamation of local governments: the Swiss debate in the European context by Dafflon, Bernard
In 
International Center for Public Policy 
Working Paper 12-04 
January 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary amalgamation of local governments: 
the Swiss debate in the European context 
 
 
 
 
Bernard Dafflon 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Center for Public Policy 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
United States of America 
 
Phone: (404) 651-1144 
Fax: (404) 651-4449 
Email: hseraphin@gsu.edu  
Internet: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html 
 
Copyright 2006, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. No part 
of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by 
any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner. 
 
 
 
 
International Center for Public Policy 
Working Paper 12-04 
 
 
 
Voluntary amalgamation of local 
governments: the Swiss debate in the 
European context 
 
Bernard Dafflon 
 
January 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Center for Public Policy 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
 
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with 
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public 
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the 
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including 
the International Center for Public Policy. 
 
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy is to provide academic and professional 
training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and 
sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.  
 
The International Center for Public Policy at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies is 
recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through 
technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a 
diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government 
organizations, legislative bodies and private sector institutions. 
 
The success of the International Center for Public Policy reflects the breadth and depth of the 
in-house technical expertise that the International Center for Public Policy can draw upon. The 
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have 
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive 
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew 
Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around the world. 
Our technical assistance strategy is not to merely provide technical prescriptions for policy 
reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with the host government and donor agency to 
identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions and implement reforms. 
 
The International Center for Public Policy specializes in four broad policy areas: 
 
 Fiscal policy, including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform 
 Fiscal decentralization, including fiscal decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental 
transfer systems, urban government finance 
 Budgeting and fiscal management, including local government budgeting, performance-
based budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting 
 Economic analysis and revenue forecasting, including micro-simulation, time series 
forecasting, 
 
For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please 
visit our website at http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html or contact us by email at 
hseraphin@gsu.edu. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary amalgamation of local 
governments: 
the Swiss debate in the European context 
 
 
Bernard Dafflon  
University of Fribourg 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
In the policy domain, no one seems to have asked to what extent the theoretical foundations for 
structural reform play a role in real-world structural reform programs. Put differently, can extant and 
new economic theory on optimality in local government structure explain the observed incidence of 
structural reform in actual local government jurisdictions? 
B. Dollery and L. Robotti 
Introduction, page 3 
The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform, 2008 
 
 
 
The debate about the amalgamation of local government units (thereafter LGUs for 
simplicity – in Switzerland: “communes” or “Gemeinden”) usually stems from the fact 
that LGUs’ political borders (the institutional territory) do no longer coincide with the 
economic boundaries required for an efficient provision of most local public services 
(the functional territory). And both do not correspond with the relational territory 
which arises out of the private and professional activities of LGUs’ residents as they 
commute daily or periodically for work, shopping and leisure (Dafflon and Ruegg, 2003: 
890). Additional problems are the openness of economic activities and the emergence 
of industrial clusters which largely overlap local boundaries. Finally, urban areas and 
agglomerations usually regroup several neighbouring LGUs whereas the needs for 
specific public services are identical in each of them and require horizontal 
cooperation. 
 
The core question of this paper is how to reform the institutional and functional 
territories in such a way that public services are delivered efficiently, according to local 
preferences and in a way that responds to the needs expressed in the larger relational 
territory. For the local public sector, the  main concern is the reorganisation in a new, 
coherent public institution of the three circles of deciders, beneficiaries and payers, 
that is: 
- the residents in the commune that vote the provision of a public service 
(admittedly, corporate business and business units have no vote),  
- the users whose residence or domiciliation can be in but also  outside the territory 
of the LGU which provides the service and  
- the taxpayers when according to the principle of origin, taxation is attributed to 
the commune of residence of individuals or legal domiciliation of business 
companies.  
 
Several financial or spatial solutions are possible to restore the coincidence between 
the three circles. If we abstract from financial transfers, the theoretical and practical 
answers are that LGUs should either coordinate horizontally or amalgamate. 
Horizontal coordination is possible under various legal regimes, through private 
contracts, or through public and  administrative law (special service precinct, syndicate 
of LGUs and association of communes, for example). In the Swiss context, Della Santa 
(1996) was first to explore from the point of view of institutional and political economy 
the issues of horizontal cooperation between LGUs under private or public law. Dafflon 
and Ruegg (2001) further developed the issues in designing the “optimal” institutional 
agglomeration (urban areas), a theme which was thoroughly scrutinized and pursued 
by Perritaz (2003b). At the same period, Frey and Eichenberger (1999, 2006) proposed 
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a totally different approach with the FOCJs, for functional, overlapping  and competing 
jurisdictions. This paper focuses on the voluntary amalgamation of LGUs, one of the 
possible solutions experienced in the Swiss case. But first, three general points deserve 
some attention.   
 
 The debate about the size of government units is not new. Olson (1969) discoursed 
on the principle of fiscal equivalence between deciders, beneficiaries and payers in the 
division of responsibilities among the different levels of government. Following Oates 
(1972: 38ss) and King (1984: 50-85), most first generation theories of fiscal federalism 
have devoted pages to promoting the “optimal size” of local service precincts. But this 
does not help the territorial organisation in practice for at least three reasons. First, 
the theory is developed for one service1, whereas LGUs propose a basket of local 
public services. Second, it does consider only purely economic arguments, drawing a 
flat functional and territorial map, whereas one knows that local territories result from 
past history and from social, demographic and geographic environmental variables. 
Third, amalgamation is a political and democratic process, not an economic and 
technocratic drawing. Practices show other roads (Swianiewicz, 2002; Dollery and 
Robotti, 2008). 
 
 The debate divides Europe in two territorial blocks which also correspond to two 
political options (Dafflon, 2003: 276-77). Table 1 recapitulates. [1] Between 1952 and 
1972, compulsory amalgamation by decision of the centre has been an almost 
exclusive specificity of countries in the North of Europe, with a drastic reduction in the 
number of LGUs. Compulsory amalgamation in the South (the “Latin” world) was not 
successful. [2] From this period, voluntary amalgamation is dominant in the South of 
Europe. Switzerland is an interesting border case: except for one canton (Glarus in 
2006), all LGUs’ amalgamations have been on a voluntary base including in the German 
speaking cantons.  
  
                                                     
1
  On this point, I would urge the profession to stop presenting this approach as a theory of the optimal 
size of local government when it is, in fact, the optimal size of one functional service precinct. This is 
substantially different and cannot be transposed without important theoretical changes to existing 
political government units. 
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Table 1       LGUs’ amalgamation policies, Europe, Selected countries 
country year reference 
Number of LGUs 
before after 2007 
Norway 1952 
1956 
Committee on the amalgamation of 
municipalities 
Law on the amalgamation of municipalities 
 
744 
 
454 
 
431 
Denmark 1958 Law on the re-mapping of municipal jurisdictions 
Municipal 
1385 275  
2005 Reform of June 21, 1975 (effective 2007)   98 
Sweden 1961 
 
Expert committee on LGUs’ regrouping 
“principles on the new mapping of 
municipalities” 
 
2281 
 
278 
 
290 
England 1967 
1972 
Radcliff-Maud Report 
Law on local governments 
 
1383 
 
402 
 
354 
Germany 1969 Wagner thesis: “Territorial Reform of Local 
Government in the Länder” (from 1971 to 1980) 
 
24386 
 
8501 
 
12312 
Belgium 1971 Law of July 23,  on the amalgamation of 
communes 
2669 596 589 
 
France 1971 Law of July 16, on the amalgamation of 
communes 
38814 36433 36683 
Italy 1971 Creation of regions with “ordinary statute”: 
communalization  
8032 8066 8101 
Spain 1978 Constitution of December 29, 1978 8800 8150 8111 
Switzerland From 
1973 
Ad hoc cantonal decrees on the amalgamation of 
communes, from canton to canton 
(1970) 
2915 
(2011) 
2551 
 
2721 
Sources: Derycke and Gilbert 1988;  Council of Europe, 1995; for 2007: Hoorens, 2008; for Switzerland: Swiss 
Statistical Office, various years. 
 
 
 Too many too small communes is a real preoccupation in European countries2 
(Marcou, 2000; Swianiewicz, 2002), but not only. A unique case is that of Quebec.3 In 
2000 the Provincial Parliament passed a series of laws that obliged municipalities to 
amalgamate (from 212 to 42 communes) for two mains reasons: [1] too much 
fragmentation was creating inefficiencies in the delivery of local public services and a 
proliferation of spillovers; [2] the proliferation of intermunicipal collaborations reduces 
the openness and clarity with respect to decision-making and diminishes political 
accountability to residents (Québec, 2000: 20). In the 2002-3 campaign for the 
Provincial election, the opposition party (Parti Libéral du Québec - PLQ) promised 
legislation changes in order to permit residents to decide through referenda whether 
they would maintained  the amalgamations that were imposed by the former 
government or return to the previous situation. When the opposition came into 
power, the “des-amalgamation process” was launched4 not because the previous 
reasons were wrong, but because the now-in-power PLQ was against “compulsory” 
amalgamation. This move illustrates one of the key problems of LGUs amalgamation: 
sound economic arguments versus participative democracy. 
                                                     
2
 See also the special issue of «Pouvoirs locaux », no 81 II/2009 on “Territories in the European Union”: 
decentralization, territorial rationalization and local organization in Europe. 
http://www.idecentralisation.asso.fr/revue.php 
3
 Perritaz. 2003a, gives a thorough account of this historical sequence and draw the lessons on 
“compulsory” versus “voluntary” amalgamation, and for Switzerland. 
4
 The des-amalgamation process required a majority of votes (51%) and minimum participation 
threshold (35%). The referendum was demanded in 89 pre-amalgamation municipalities. In 58 the result 
was the amalgamation status quo and in 31 a des-amalgamation. 
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With this foreword in mind, the present paper is divided in six sections. Section one 
summarizes the the debate about LGUs’ amalgamation in the Swiss context, past and 
present. Past, because without due attention paid to the political history of communal 
amalgamations in the cantons, one does not understand the “voluntary” versus 
“compulsory” core issue. Present, because despite a modest decrease in the number 
of communes (from 3021 in 1990 to 2551 at the end of 2010), Switzerland is the 
successful story of  voluntary LGUs amalgamations in Europe. Section two tackles the 
fundamental problem: if too many LGUs are too small, when is small too small and 
why? Horizontal cooperation is one possible solution, but it creates serious problems, 
explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents the core concept of “noyaux durs” which is 
one of the effective approaches to LGUs amalgamation. Section 5 details the cantonal 
financial incentives that are needed to encourage voluntary amalgamation, besides a 
cantonal planning strategy and technical help in the process of amalgamation. Section 
6 concludes with some notes on the performance of the system. 
 
1  Local governments’ amalgamation in Switzerland: a reminder 
 
The trend of LGUs’ amalgamation in Switzerland is summarized in Table 2 which gives 
the decrease in the number of political communes in the cantons for the 1950 – 2011 
period together with the average and median population size per commune per 
canton. The actual average population per commune is around 3000 – which 
corresponds to the lowest figures in the Europa league just before Slovakia,  France, 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic, all with less that 2000 (Dexia, 2008: 41). The value of 
the national median is 1378 residents – but with figure as low as 377 in Graubünden.  
 
Yet, although several cantons have promoted amalgamations through financial 
incentives, only three of them, Fribourg, Bern and Ticino, proposed a policy target 
before 2000. Seven other cantons have joined the club thereafter, though in most 
cases on the basis of a “non-official” reference planning – which really illustrates how 
politically sensitive is the issue. Table 3 summarizes and gives the references. Two 
cantonal historical paths serve to exemplify the “voluntary” versus “compulsory” issue 
and, at the same time, the tension between economic and political variables. One 
canton is Fribourg, with the oldest policy experience. The other is Glarus, where 
compulsory amalgamation of communes was recently imposed top-down – though 
democratically decided - reducing their number from 25 to 3.   
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Table 2   Number and population size of Swiss communes, per canton 
canton 
Number of communes  
(situation  January 1, reference year) 
variation Population 2009 
  1950 1990 2000 2005 2009 2011 
1990-
2000 
2000-
2011 
Resident   average  median  
Zurich 171 171 171 171 171 171 0 0 1'332'727 7'794 3'403 
Berne 493 412 400 398 392 383 -12 -17 969'299 2'473 934 
Lucerne 107 107 107 103 88 87 0 -20 368'742 4'190 2'175 
Uri 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 35'162 1'758 814 
Schwyz 30 30 30 30 30 30 0 0 143'719 4'791 3'041 
Obwald 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 0 34'429 4'918 4'752 
Nidwald 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 40'737 3'703 3'249 
Glarus 29 29 29 27 25 3 0 -26 38'370 1'535 1'001 
Zoug 11 11 11 11 11 11 0 0 110'384 10'035 8'299 
Fribourg 284 259 242 176 168 167 -17 -75 268'537 1'598 930 
Soleure 132 130 126 126 125 121 -4 -5 251'830 2'015 1'028 
Bâle-Ville 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 186'672 62'224 20'539 
Bâle-Campagne 74 73 86 86 86 86 13 0 271'214 3'154 1'273 
Schaffhouse 35 34 34 32 27 27 0 -7 75'303 2'789 820 
Appenzell Rh.-Ext 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0 53'054 2'653 1'689 
Appenzell Rh.-Int 6 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 15'549 2'592 2'004 
Saint-Gall 91 90 90 89 86 85 0 -5 471'152 5'479 3'741 
Grisons 221 213 212 208 190 178 -1 -34 190'459 1'002 377 
Argovie 233 232 232 231 229 220 0 -12 591'632 2'584 1'483 
Thurgovie 201 179 80 80 80 80 -99 0 241'811 3'023 1'936 
Tessin 257 247 245 204 169 157 -2 -88 332'736 1'969 860 
Vaud 388 385 384 381 375 375 -1 -9 688'245 1'835 512 
Valais 170 163 163 153 143 141 0 -22 303'241 2'121 969 
Neuchâtel 62 62 62 62 53 53 0 -9 170'924 3'225 1'201 
Genève 45 45 45 45 45 45 0 0 446'106 9'913 2'604 
Jura          -  82 83 83 64 64 1 -19 69'822 1'091 552 
Total 3101 3021 2899 2763 2624 2551 -122 -348 7'701'856 2'935 1'378 
Sources: 2000 à 2009: OFS:http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/02/blank/data/01.html;  
2010 ; OFS:http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/-nomenklaturen/blank/blank/raum_glied/01.html. 
Up-dated information in : http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeindefusionen_in_der_Schweiz  
 
Table 3     Cantons  with a  targeted  planning in LGUs’ amalgamation (2011)  
Canton Year of planning Number LGUs 
at the time 
proposal Number of 
LGUs 2011 
Difference 
to target 
Fribourg 1974 / 
1999/2011 
245 89  167 - 78 
Bern 1998 400 70 383 - 313 
Ticino 1998 245 86 157 - 71 
Luzern 2000 107 min. 3000 Hi 87 ? 
Valais 2001 163 n.a. 141 ? 
Neuchâtel 2006 62 11 53 -42 
Vaud 2006 381 107  375 - 268 
Glarus 2006 25 3  3 Ok 
Jura 2007 83 29  64 - 35 
Aargau 2007 229 17 
 
220 -203 
Solothurn 2008 125 Concept to be studied by the 
department of local affairs 
121 ? 
Sources : Fribourg  Dafflon 2000; Ticino Il cantone e I suoi comuni, Dipartimento delle Instituzioni Sezione Enti locali, Bellinzona, 
1998, vol. 2b ; Luzern Regierungsrat  "Luzern 99" Massnahmen füreiner Strukturreform im Kanton Luzern, 17 Januar 1997 ; Valais 
Commission paritaire pour les relations canton-communes, 4ème rapport relatif aux fusions de communes, Canton du Valais, Sion, 
décembre 2000 ; Neuchâtel, Rapport 06.014  du 8 février 2006 du Conseil d'Etat au Grand Conseil à l'appui d'un projet de décret 
relatif à l'utilisation du solde du fonds destiné aux réformes de structures des communes ; Vaud Golaz, 2006 ; Solothurn 
http://www.so.ch/fileadmin/internet/vwd/vdgem/pdf/gemeindeorganisation/ Glarus see below in the text; Jura Chappuis, 
2007 ; Aargau "Unterstützung von Gemeindezusammenschlüssen",  Botschaft des Regierungsrats des Kantons Aargau an den 
Grossen Rat vom 19. Januar 2011. 
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Fribourg 
The history of amalgamation in the canton of Fribourg (with three key dates: 1974, 
2000 and 2011) is synthetic of the European debate in time and content. One cannot 
understand the whole process of voluntary amalgamation in Switzerland without 
reference to this case study because the canton of Fribourg has been a key player and 
leader in this policy for the last forty years (Dafflon, 1998, 2000 and 2003). 
 
 In the early 70s the Canton’s Executive mandated a study on the “efficient size of 
the communes”. The “Gaudard-Piveteau” Report (1971) examined five functions and 
proposed two thresholds: communes should count at least 1000 residents for an 
efficient local administration, for primary education (with two-degree classes), sport 
centre and robust tax resources, and at least 5000 beneficiaries for clean water 
networks. The study was not based on theoretical criteria but on cross-section panel 
data observation of the actual public expenditures in the communes, which gave some 
kind of admitted U-shape average cost curves. The result was a proposal to reduce the 
number of communes from  284 to around 90. Following the Report, the cantonal 
Executive decided  a “Nordist” approach5 with a draft law on the compulsory 
amalgamation of communes. The law was accepted on May 21,  1973,  in Parliament 
with an “87 for - 9 against” vote. The referendum was demanded by a group of citizens 
residents in small communes, who finally got the last word. The law was refused in 
cantonal vote on May 26, 1974 by 60% of the voters.   
 
The Government’s Message and the minutes of the Parliamentary debates contain all 
the pros and cons that were discussed in Europe at the time (Canton of Fribourg, BCG, 
1973: 333-369): small is beautiful but expensive, larger would be better which permit 
administrative economies, economies of scale and improved efficiency in the 
production of local public services, internalization of spillovers, more robust tax bases. 
Compulsory amalgamation was justified mainly for economic reasons.  Opponents 
justified their position on democratic arguments: “voice” and free democratic choice 
at the grass root level, no top-down administrative and technocratic process. At the 
same time, started a successful campaign for the voluntary amalgamation of 
communes, which has reduced their number from 284 (1974) to 167 (2011).  
 
 The amalgamation policy initiated in 2000 for six years was the last, in the cantonal 
Executive’s view,  to obtain a financial aid. It introduced a substantial change in the 
grant system (see below, section 4) aiming at giving a new incentive to the voluntary 
amalgamation policy. It was based on a territorial map of voluntary amalgamation 
using the new concept of “noyaux forts” (Dafflon, 2000), which would reduce the 
number of communes from 245 (1999) to 89.  
 
 In 2006, a Parliamentary motion commanded the Executive to present a “third 
phase” law on amalgamation (BGC, 2010: 2252). The objective is to attain less than 
100 communes, with an adaptation of the financial incentive. The law was submitted 
to compulsory referendum and accepted on May 15, 2011, by 73% of the voters. It will 
come into force on January 2012. 
                                                     
5
 Fribourg is on the language border between French and German. The canton is official bilingual, as also 
is its capital city. The language distribution is around 2/3 French speaking and 1/3 German speaking, 
with German speaking communes in the North and North-West of the cantonal territory. 
8 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
The 1974-199 voluntary amalgamation policy aimed at merging very small communes 
(to a larger neighbour LGU) which had financial problems, mainly insufficient tax base 
owing to the new (unfunded) mandated functions assigned to communes 
(environmental policy, reform of the hospital network, residences for elderly disabled 
persons). In fact, behind the words, it was bail-out policy. The 2000-2005 sequence 
aimed at increasing LGUs’ size (number of residents) in order to reinforce their budget 
position and financial capacity with tax pooling on a larger base. With the 2012 new 
incitative policy, the target is the amalgamation of larger municipalities in urban areas 
in order to solve the problems of land zoning, common infrastructures for clusters and 
to reduce tax competition within the same (but at the moment “inter-communal”) 
development zone – though this is not officially expressed in these terms. 
 
Glarus 
The recent history of amalgamation in canton Glarus is also very informative of the 
debate around voluntary versus compulsory amalgamation of LGUs.6 In 2005, the 
canton was divided in 27 communes, 18 school districts, 16 social aid service precincts 
and 9 Bürgengemeinde.  The cantonal executive proposed a territorial reform to 
reduce these four territorial mapping to 10 communes in charge of all these functions. 
Since the proposal needed a constitutional change, the Landsgemeinde of November 
3, 2006 - in Glarus, the direct assembly of citizens – was to vote the issue. But a 
citizen’s proposal that 10 were too much and 3 would be better (which correspond to 
the natural geography of the canton) obtained a short majority to the surprise of both 
the cantonal executive and the assembly.  
 
The Landsgemeinde decision was challenged, first in the cantonal Court, then in the 
Federal Supreme Court of Justice, with the argument that the proposal for 3 
communes was not made in advance and not written in the calling of the assembly. 
Thus decision was not taken with full knowledge of the consequences. Eventually the 
Federal Court confirmed on November 3, 2006 the validity of the proposal and the 
legal obligation for the cantonal executive to re-study a new territorial map with 3 and 
not 10 communes. Soon, an initiative was launched by a group of citizens under the 
motto “a reform for efficient, democratic and fair LGUs in a dynamic cantonal setting” 
in order to return to 10 communes. The initiative succeeded and, for the first time 
since the 1887 cantonal Constitution, an extraordinary Landsgemeinde was to debate 
the issue on November 25, 2007. The reform with three new communes was 
confirmed. The new communes have been enforced on January 1, 2011.  
 
In both cases (10 or 3 LGUs),  the government’s arguments were that the reform 
should simplify the territorial mapping, regroup functions under a unique local  
institution in order to increase efficiency in the production and delivery of local public 
services, administrative simplicity and better management, political accountability, 
enlarged financial and political powers vis-à-vis the canton and increased autonomy of 
decision. 
 
  
                                                     
6
 Web page of canton Glarus, www.gl.ch/xml_1/internet/de/application/d578/f598.cfm “Gemeinde-
reformen”. Also  http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glarner_Gemeindereform 
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2 Too many too small LGUs ? 
 
The usual argument for the amalgamation of LGUs is that many of them are too small 
to perform economically and efficiently the functions assigned to them. The 
assumption is that for a large proportion of local collective service the production 
function takes a U-shape curve with decreasing average costs, mainly due to the 
importance of  infrastructure and fixed operating costs. In other words, the “size” of 
the political territory is smaller than the “optimal functional” size of  the producing 
jurisdiction, service per service. Thus it would be sound economic management to 
enlarge the former to coincide with the latter. This argumentation runs along the 
traditional fiscal federalism theory of the optimal size of service precincts. But, this 
assertion raises two questions in practice:  what is too small and why? 
 
What is too small? 
When the “size” of LGUs is not adequate, what is the reference:  the number of 
residents in a commune, the number of beneficiaries of local public services, the 
population density or the area to be covered? The usual theoretical answer is the 
number of service users or beneficiaries; and the geographical landscape of the model 
is flat. But this is not so in practice.   
 
Take the example of primary school. Beneficiaries are the school-aged children, neither 
the residents nor the voters. Yet the number of beneficiaries (the “optimal” N in the U-
curve) cannot be counted as a direct reference because school-aged children are 
distributed in level-classes: thus the “optimal” size does not simply depend on the 
number, but also on the preferred organisation of level-classes.  And it may well be 
that a LGU accepts (prefers) three classes with two levels each in its own school 
building rather than a school with six one level-classes in a larger school district. In this 
case, the medium term demography of  LGUs (actual and future proportion of school-
aged children to population) and the school organisation are additional variables. And 
since the map is no flat, distance and topography may also play a crucial role. 
Therefore there is no general answer to this example which needs case to case analysis 
– even though the economic arguments of economies of scale, decision costs and local 
preferences  partly hold in all circumstances. 
 
Another difficulty appears when local services are partially substitutes. Take the 
example of family and medical home care versus residential houses for elderly people. 
In the aging process, the need for one service or the other is not edge cut, but a grey 
zone leaving place for appreciation. Yet the production functions are clearly different, 
almost constant average costs for care at home, and U-shaped with a limit of capacity 
for residence (Blum, 2008: 97-99). Up to a certain point, the need for a larger 
functional jurisdiction will clearly depends on local preference for one type of care or 
the other, proximity and  the demographic distribution in the concerned LGUs. The 
debate for the centralization of maternity is of the same vein: proximity, quality of the 
service, professional ability of the doctors and nurses, sophistication of the technical 
equipment are most often mentioned. Answers are various and do not stem from 
financial and managerial arguments only. 
 
Yet, even if one accepts that in the three above examples, the functional dimensions 
exceed the institutional territories and enlargement is appropriate, the new functional 
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perimeters needs not be the same. The open question is thus what could be the 
adequate size of the new enlarged political jurisdiction for a functional “basket” with 
the three functions? 
 
Why too small? 
In textbook fiscal federalism, the traditional explicative variables around the issue are: 
the homogeneity /heterogeneity of  individual preferences for local public goods and 
services, possible economies of scale, geographical externalities (positive) and 
congestion costs due to commuters, information and decision costs (Oates, 1972: 38-
53; King, 1996: 55-76; Swianiewicz, 2002: 10-11). The question is whether empirical 
studies confirmed this approach, or add other additional criteria.  Table 4 summarizes 
the methods and results for the canton of Fribourg. Focusing on one canton is 
interesting for four reasons: (i) the institutional environment is homogenous through 
time; (ii) the period considered (1967-2010) is long enough to present robust results; 
(iii) the amalgamation policy in this canton has developed in three phases: 1974-1999, 
2000-2005 and 2011-2018, with specific changes in the financial incitation of the 
canton to encourage voluntary merging of LGUs; (iv) two documents from the cantonal 
Executive (1999 and 2010) allow to confront the respective arguments of the canton 
and its communes. 
 
Four categories of reasons can be observed: financial arguments, efficiency in the 
production and delivery of local public services, political institution and participative 
democracy. The first two categories appear throughout the reference periods and   
sound familiar: LGUs should offer local public services, efficiently produced and 
delivered [2 below] under the budget constraint [1] with a view to maximising the 
fiscal differential if they want to remain attractive in fiscal competition. Categories [3] 
and [4] relate to the institutional position of local elected executive and, more 
recently, to participative democracy – two outsiders in the fiscal federalism literature.
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Table 4       Main reasons advocated for amalgamations of LGUs, canton of Fribourg 
Case study Dafflon Cantonal Executive Zbinden Guerry-Berchier Cantonal Executive 
 
1998 1999 2008 2009 2010 
canton Fribourg Fribourg Fribourg Fribourg Fribourg 
N of almagamation 32 decret 56 37 law 
period 1967-1999 2000 - 2005 1999-2006 2000-2006 2012-2018 
method text analysis 1) text analysis 2) 
author’s 
appreciation 
questionnaire 
(52 returned) 
questionnaire  
(31 returned) 
text analysis 3) 
Financial argument             
1 the negative fiscal position under a hard budget constraint; 28   x 42     
2 weak financial position prior to amalgamation       35     
3 increase tax potential or lower fiscal stress   X x 36     
4 increase financial or investment capacity     x 35 
21 equal; 3 increased; 
4 decreased 
X 
5 financial aid of the canton       44 7   
6 too much reliance on fiscal equalization   X         
7 cantonal pressure         2   
Production and delivery of services             
8 economies of scale   X   48     
9 increased efficiency in the production of services           X 
10 new demands from residents     x       
11 
the possibility for the recipient municipality to extend its 
development zone 
13           
12 
the need for coordination in the technical provision of local public 
services 
4           
13 increasing complexity in existing function     x       
14 
better vertical assignment of functions between the canton and the 
communes 
  X         
Political institution,  executive             
15 the difficulty to find candidate for the local executive  14 X x   3   
16 better efficacity of elected       35     
17 
the rationalization of municipal management and mutual interest in 
administrative efficiency, 
15     36 "central"   
participative democracy             
18 increased autonomy        40 24 equal ; 8 better X 
19 political weight in horizontal and vertical negotiations         11   
1) Minutes of the meetings of local executives and local citizens' assemblies ; 2) Message du 12 octobre 1999 relatif à l'encouragement aux fusions de communes ; 3) Message du 21 septembre  2010  
accompagnant le projet de loi sur l'encouragement aux fusions de communes. 
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[1] On local public finances,  the “hard” budget constraint is an essential explicative 
variable for pushing LGUs towards amalgamation. It must be noted that the cantonal 
legislation on the organisation and functioning of local government requires a 
balanced current budget, including amortization of the debt respecting the pay-as-you-
use principle.7 If this is not respected, taxation must be increased. Two correlated 
arguments are the necessity to reduce the tax stress – partly with regard to horizontal 
tax competition – and the need for LGUs to propose new investment projects for 
maintaining or increasing the “attractiveness” for residents or activities. One 
interesting argument is the need to pool the tax bases for reasons of risk aversion and 
sustainability in the local budgets. 
 
[2] Gaining efficiency in the production and delivery of local public service corresponds 
to the textbook arguments: economies of scales, local preferences (“new demands”) 
and horizontal coordination (a term which probably corresponds to geographical 
externalities or spillovers rather to congestion costs – owing to the small size of  LGUs 
in the canton).  
 
[3] The institutional category relates to the position of the elected executive, on one 
side, and the general administrative management of LGUs. The first argument is the 
difficulty of finding a sufficient number of good candidates for local executives in a 
system where this position is exercised by non-professional politicians, besides their 
own professional activities.8 This situation already existed prior to 2000, but the stress 
appears to have increased more recently. Second, larger local government can provide 
better qualified professional profiles to unload elected executives from managerial and 
pure administrative tasks -  a situation that may lead to more public interest and 
participation in local politics. 
 
[4] The last group of reasons for amalgamation corresponds to participative 
democracy. It can be explained in the following way (Dafflon, 2000: 846-850 ; Perritaz, 
2003b: 265-271 ). Swiss LGUs have a long tradition in the search for productive 
efficiency and minimum average unit cost in the production and delivery of local public 
services. If “small is beautiful”, one also knows that it can be expensive. Thus for 
decades,  LGUs have engaged in horizontal cooperation in order to minimize costs, size 
economies of scales and internalize geographical externalities. Based on a 
questionnaire to which 2391 LGUs answered (82% return), Ladner et al. (2000: 71) 
                                                     
7
 This corresponds to the revisited ‘golden rule’ that requires balance or surplus on the current budget 
and accepts borrowing only for investment purposes. “Revisited” because the debt resulting from 
investment must be reimbursed on the pay-as-you-use basis, that is on a linear basis within a period of 
time that corresponds to the effective  use of the infrastructure (33 years for a school building = 3% 
annual amortization), with the argument that after the referred period of time, rehabilitation of the 
property will be costly despite correct annual maintenance expenditures.  
In the canton of Fribourg, if current expenditures including interest and debt installment exceed 
revenues (2% at the cantonal level, 5% at the local level in the budget as well as in the account balance), 
taxation on income and business profit must be increased to restore balance. The constraint is “hard” 
not only with regard to this rule but also because more than 95 per cent of local revenues are own 
revenues for mandated functions as well as for own expenditure choices. 
8
  In Switzerland, except in large cities and urban areas, most members of LGUs' executives are not 
professional. They often not only bear political responsibilities but also accomplish administrative and 
managerial tasks. Resignations during the legislative period (4 or 5 years depending of the canton) for 
professional reasons and too much work load in the commune is frequent. 
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estimated at 21 697 the number of LGUs’ engagements in horizontal cooperation in 33 
local functions. The  six functions at the top were primary school (76% of the 
communes), medical care (70%); waste water treatment (66%); drinking water (63%); 
civil defence (62%) and care to elderly people (58%). Decisions in specific service 
precincts organised under public administrative law are in the hand of delegates who 
are appointed by LGUs’ executive (only in a few cantons, designated  by the LGU’s local 
assembly), and vote freely. With the multiplicity of special service precincts, which 
cover different functional territories (each corresponding to another club of LGUs), 
transparency is questioned and direct democratic decisions at the local level – citizens’ 
assemblies  and local parliaments – are fading away. The amalgamation of LGUs that 
all belong to several same service precincts could internalize horizontal cooperation 
and restore direct decision of local voters. This argument is at the core of the concept 
of “noyaux forts” developed by Dafflon (2000). 
 
The cantonal arguments 
The cantonal interest in voluntary amalgamation of LGUs (yellow shaded in Table 4) is 
indirect in comparison to those related in textbook fiscal federalism. Access to 
economies of scale (productive efficiency and cost saving) and increased tax potential 
will produce better financial results of the communes, which in turn will facilitate the 
vertical re-assignment of functions between the canton and  LGUs (larger and 
financially healthier communes can do more), which will in turn reduce the need for 
fiscal equalization.9 Of course, the cantons also provide arguments which appeal to 
LGUs: it would be easier to find candidates for the executive because the tasks would 
be more interesting, autonomy is increased. In the 2010 message (BCG, 2010: 2146 
and 2260) the arguments are given without detail:  amalgamation would increase 
productive efficiency, financial and investment capacity and restore local autonomy! 
 
3 Five problems with horizontal cooperation 
 
Whereas horizontal cooperation at the local level in the form of functional jurisdictions 
and ad hoc service precincts resolve the economic problem of too small municipalities, 
it also creates a new situation and the emergence of new difficulties. One category of 
difficulties arises because of the institutional arrangement. The other big problem is 
the lack of transparency due to the multiplication of territorial divisions, possibly one 
for each local responsibility. All these problems, latent in the late 1980s and left aside 
because priority was given to economic efficiency and to the need of accessing to new 
services, became evident in the last decade. They can be explained under the five 
following caps: (i) the principal – agent problem; (ii) Information asymmetry; (iii) moral 
hazard; (iv) the lack of transparency resulting from the excessive complication in the 
territorial organization of local public services and (v) less participative democracy. 
 
The principal – agent problem 
In a local parliamentary democracy, resident voters are principals who elect the LGU’s 
executive. Local elected (acting as first agent) are responsible for the provision of 
                                                     
9
 In Fribourg, revenue equalization, based on RTS (eight tax sources) and LGUs’ potential tax capacity is 
horizontal. Expenditure needs equalization is vertical, funded by the canton, and correspond to 50% of 
the revenue equalization annual fund. Thus, better tax potential reduces the need for revenue 
equalization and in a domino effect the amount that the canton will pay for expenditure needs 
equalization. See Dafflon 2010. 
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(offer)  but do not produce themselves local public services. In turn the LGU’s 
executives (in the role of second principal) contract out the production of local public 
services either directly to local civil servants (in house production) or indirectly to 
private enterprises (second agents). From the point of view of the production of local 
public service, this process is characterised by a chain of "principal – agent" relations. 
 
 
Figure 5    The “principal-agent” chain in horizontal cooperation 
 
 
 
With inter-communal horizontal cooperation, the problem is more intricate since "the 
second" principal is no longer unique: several LGUs have to accord each other and 
share the same policy approach and to associate – which is not evident – in order to 
produce more efficiently (economies of scale, spillovers and the like) a local service. 
But the communal executives (who are second principals with regard to their own 
residents) will delegate representatives in the association. The association executive 
becomes responsible for the offer, but will not execute itself the demand. It will 
command the production and organise the delivery of the service either through its 
own production facilities or through outsourcing. In this situation the association 
becomes at the same time the agent of the cooperating communes (it receives the 
task to offer the service) and the third principal vis-à-vis the producing unit (public or 
private) which is the third agent in the chain.  
 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry arises before and after association with different degrees. 
First, during the negotiation to form the association, the “first” and “second” principals 
try to obtain as much information as possible about the agent before the contract is 
signed or before the cooperative institution is created. Normally the agent is not ready 
to depart from strategic information he might have and behaves consequently. At this 
stage, however, the room for manoeuvre of the agent is not as large as it is in the 
Local voters and 
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subsequent phases: the principal can always refuse to associate if he feel that the 
information is insufficient of biased.  
 
But the situation changes considerably in production and delivery of the local service, 
once the association exists – if only because then “exit” is expensive. The agent can 
use his competencies, his managerial capacity and his knowledge of the production 
function in order to reach his own targets. He can introduce innovative procedure 
without transferring his knowledge to the principal. He can also attract part of the 
economies of scale for his own benefit (rent seeking from his point of view; X-
inefficiencies from the point of view of the local residents: they do not obtain the full 
economies of scale in lower tax prices). 
 
The first problem (represented with the dotted arrow in figure 5) is how the 
information circulates from the production unit to the residents in the communes, and 
how the residents can control the production unit so that the service corresponds to 
their preference (in the alternative “voice” rather than “exit”). The second problem is 
that this model must be duplicated for all local public services which need horizontal 
cooperation. 
 
Moral hazard  
In the principal-agent chain, the moral hazard comes from the fact that once he is 
chosen, the agent who becomes the second principal will not necessarily defend the 
interest of the residents (first principal). He may not engage in exactly the same 
provision of local public services. The agent uses the room of manoeuvre that his 
knowledge of the production function gives him, his managerial capacities, uncertainty 
and the principal's lack of information to fulfil his own internal requirements. And this 
is duplicated in the third chain, between the association and the production unit. 
Therefore, in addition to uncertainty, the principal does not know how his agent will 
behave strategically (in the worst case, there is a problem of adverse selection). With 
many local public services, the same problem repeats itself as many times. 
 
Excessive complication in the territorial organization  
With the system of inter-communal functional jurisdictions, and in reference to Oates' 
model, any resident would belong to and participate to as many jurisdictions as the 
number of local public service he requires. Moreover, since the special dimension of 
the production functions differs from one service to the other, there is the additional 
difficulty to understand a multitude of different service boundaries and territorial 
organization. There is no reason to believe that the territorial map of primary school 
districts should overlap exactly the territorial map of individual social aid or the 
distribution of water, for example. The consequences are both higher information 
costs and lack of transparency in the general territorial mapping of services. 
 
Less participative democracy 
In terms of participative democracy, the production and delivery of local services in 
intercommunal association mean that citizens (residents, beneficiaries) cannot obtain 
informed and accountable answers for their questions from the local councillors about 
these service deliveries since the latter have no direct access to these functions. Or 
one would have to involve oneself in understanding the functioning and management 
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of as many service precincts as the number of local services he would use. The option 
“voice” is considerably degraded: this situation is named "democratic deficit". 
 
In most Swiss cantons the rules that apply to special districts or functional jurisdictions 
are not the same than the rules that apply to single municipalities. Box 6 summarizes 
the differences. The discussion usually focuses on two dimensions: 
- democracy: what institutional structure can best secure the citizens’ control over 
local government and over the management of the functional jurisdiction providing 
the local public service? 
- accountability: how to secure the fiscal and budget responsibility of the functional 
jurisdiction? 
 
Box 6 points out the relative differences in participative democracy for local residents 
in the canton of Fribourg, when decision for the provision of local public services are 
taken in the municipality of residence (left column) or within special service precinct of 
which the municipality of residence is a member (right column). Similar reasoning must 
be provided for each canton to adapt to its specific democratic rules. 
 
   Box 6   Comparative institutional characteristics (canton of Fribourg) 
Single municipality Special district or functional jurisdiction or 
association of communes 
in direct democracy, residents are members of 
the local  assembly; in local parliamentary 
democracy, members of the local parliament 
are elected 
no direct democracy; the local representatives in 
the jurisdiction's  assembly of delegates are 
designated by the local executives 
executive councillors are elected the management board is designated by the 
assembly of delegates 
the assignment of functions respects the 
principle of subsidiarity  [devolution] 
authority is delegated [the statutes of the 
functional jurisdiction must list explicitly  the 
domains of activities] 
tax capacity No tax capacity.  Funding is guaranteed through  
financial transfers from member municipalities.   
fiscal responsibility and accountability no financial and budgetary accountability: excess 
of current expenditures over finance are covered 
according to a share that has to figure in the 
statutes and can neither be disputed nor escaped; 
deficit  bail out and borrowing limits are written 
in the statutes. 
Facultative referendum 
In direct democracy: none, decisions can be 
challenged within the assembly; 
In local parliamentary democracy: new 
investment, taxes, user charges, general 
regulation, horizontal cooperation; the number 
of members in the executive or in the legislative 
assembly. 
Referendum  on the communes' adhesion to the 
jurisdiction, but none thereafter on the 
jurisdiction's current business. 
New functions must be decided by vote in the 
individual communes and need the unanimity of 
the communes 
Initiative 
In direct democracy, on all items in the 
competence of the assembly; 
In local parliamentary democracy:  new 
investments, general communal regulation and 
horizontal cooperation in the form of 
New investments within the statutory task(s) of 
the association; general regulation; financial 
guarantee; PPP participation; changes in the 
statutes. 
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association and functional jurisdiction. 
Source: Fribourg cantonal law of September 25, 1980 on the organization and function of local 
governments ( as on September21,  2011;  web page of Canton of Fribourg, > legislation)  
 
 
At this point, the global policy problem can be formulated in the following way. If one 
accepts that there are too many too small LGUs in terms of population and service 
beneficiaries, the necessity for enlarging institutional jurisdictions into larger functional 
service precincts is evident for reason of managerial capacity, efficiency and 
economies of scales in the production of local public service, internalization of 
spillovers and the like. The arguments correspond largely to what fiscal federalism 
says. There is no need to amalgamate: there exists a large variety of legal form for 
horizontal cooperation which can serve, including outsourcing. The problem arises 
with the multiplicity of territorial mappings of service precincts, with different limits 
each for a specific service. The complex overlapping network of service precincts does 
not respect the criteria of transparency, accountability, participative democracy.   
 
In other words, if the residents’ preferences are homogeneous for the service provided 
in association, if the “distance” between the beneficiaries’ demand and the actual 
production and delivery of the service is “short”, and if residents and beneficiaries 
consider only the utility of the specific service obtained, then the “democratic deficit” 
will remain low and the multiple mapping of functional jurisdictions can be 
maintained. Yet if citizens consider that LGUs are more than some kind of 
“supermarket” for delivering services, but are locus where social life must be organized 
and (the basket of) local public services are part of this design, then the need to 
restore voice and participative democracy will drive to the need for a unique, yet 
enlarged locus. Amalgamation provides a possible answer. The resulting situation 
becomes complex because the analysis leaves the realm of economic and managerial 
arguments for social consideration and citizenship, variables that are far more difficult 
to isolate and measure. 
 
This can be represented in Figure 7. Economic arguments are output-oriented: how to 
produce local public services at the lowest possible cost. The net benefits of horizontal 
cooperation first increase; but with the multiplication of service mapping, problems of 
institutional democracy, accountability and transparency appear and become more 
and more significant. The “voice” alternative (information, expression of preferences, 
accountability and control) is fading away.  Amalgamation of LGus would save both 
situations: remaining large to maintain efficiency, internalizing in the new enlarged 
institutional border as many functional entities as possible, so that the exercise of 
“voice” would be possible again. However the total efficiency gain cannot be 
internalized  after amalgamation: in a dynamic setting, horizontal cooperation will 
remain necessary for some functions. 
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Figure 7    The cost-benefit  line of horizontal cooperation and amalgamation 
 
 
 
 
 
4  What next ?  The “noyaux forts” 
 
The concept of “noyaux forts” is based on the observation of actual institutions and 
various mappings of horizontal cooperation per function with the idea of consolidating 
several functional territories in one new enlarged LGU. Starting from existing 
cooperation agreements between LGUs, the concept distinguishes first the production 
of public utilities from local collective services.  
 
For public utilities (drinking water, waste water treatment, solid waste collection and 
treatment, public transports, and the like), efficiency and managerial argument are 
essential. Case studies and field observations reveal that there is no ethical and social 
issues in provision and production. The functional size should optimize productive 
efficiency. In addition, since these services being financed according to the user-pays 
and polluter-pays principles, there are less problem of rent-seeking or X-inefficiency, 
information costs, accountability and control. Beneficiaries pay the service according 
to their individual demand; benchmarking between neighbouring service precincts 
facilitates performance measurement and control. 
 
For local service using human resources or which social content counts (first instance 
civil justice, civil protection, proximity police, sport centre, kindergarten, primary 
school, leisure and social activities, public libraries, parish, home care), the existing 
interaction between people from neighbouring communes is central; human contact 
and distance play key roles. The concept is to reorganise the political communes which 
already cooperate in several of the listed domains in a new enlarged political entity 
which approximates as much as possible the functional limits.  
 
Starting from the territorial divisions of existing inter-communal cooperative 
arrangements for various functions [SA in Figure 8 Phase 1, and similar for SB, SD, SE, SF ], 
this approach examines if and how a new unique, enlarged, multifunctional territorial 
can be constructed. This would create a new commune. In a first experimentation in 
the canton of Fribourg (Dafflon, 2000), the functional jurisdictions that were selected 
were: (i) micro regions which received federal and cantonal development grants; (ii) 
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judicial courts of first instance; (iii) fire defence units; (iv) civil defence special districts; 
(v) sectors with sport facilities; (vi) primary school districts; (vii)  300-meters shooting 
associations; (viii) parishes. If and where LGs cooperate in at least five out of these 
eight functions, then it would be possible to create a "noyaux forts" (Phase 2 in Figure 
8), institutionalised in  a  new and larger municipality. The concept is simple on first 
sight, but it hides redoubtable institutional problems  in order to restore “voice” of the 
residents citizens and dissolve certain political advantages and bureaucratic cushions 
 
 
Figure 8    The creation of new enlarged LGUs with the method of “noyaux forts” 
 
Phase 1      The constitution of a functional service precinct SA with seven communes  
Ci,  i = 1 to 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 2  When several functional jurisdictions overlap, it should be possible to  
    consolidate the members LGUs in a new larger commune 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 8 Phase 2, five communes [C1, C2, C3, C4 and C7] share the same five functions 
[SA+B+D+E+F]. They could amalgamate in one new larger LGU. C5 and C6 do not share all 
these functions. They may nevertheless merge. If not, the new LGU must accept to 
deliver the services to them on a contractual basis, with due contributions by the client 
LGUs. In this new “territorial = functional” configuration, residents of five LGUs will 
regain direct command (“voice”) over five functions, a situation which improves 
participative democracy, reduces administrative costs (the five administration of the 
service precincts can be exercised in the new LGU) without any hindrance on the 
economies of scale which existed in the service precincts (the beneficiaries have not 
changed with the amalgamation). Of course, the selected functions which are referred 
in this first experiment must be adapted from one canton to another according to the 
functions assigned at the local level. But the concept remains unchanged: public 
utilities are not considered; labor intensive service and services with social sensitive 
outcome serve. 
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When implemented in Fribourg, the method would reduce the number of LGUs from 
245 to 89 (Dafflon, 2000: 855). Only 30 communes would not be concerned.10 Under 
this new concept, from 2000 to 2011, 44 voluntary amalgamations were decided, 
concerning 122 LGUs and reducing their number from 245 (1999) to 167 (2011). Eleven 
amalgamations exactly correspond to the planned “noyaux forts”; 32 partially 
correspond (which means that not all LGUs in the given “noyau fort” merged); one 
amalgamation is outside the proposal. Only 12 LGUs did merge within a “noyau fort” 
different from the one proposed through the method. 
 
5   Financial support from the cantons 
 
The cantonal supports to LGUs’ voluntary amalgamation take three forms:  
 
(1) A general indicative planning for a voluntary amalgamation policy in the canton 
(see Table 3 above). This helps in the sense that the cantonal policy is founded on pre-
studies of the LGUs general public finance situation (time series data on expenditures, 
taxation, existing horizontal coordination), in some cases in relation with other policies 
(balanced budget constraint, investment policy, fiscal equalization, tax apportionment, 
for example). These preparative studies help in assessing the LGUs’ financial positions 
on comparative bases (cantonal benchmarks). 
 
(2) Technical and administrative support to LGUs which engage in an amalgamation 
process; also financial support in Luzern, Neuchâtel and Sankt-Gall in form of 
participation to the costs of the amalgamation study and process. The technical 
support consists of preparing the agenda for amalgamation: what to do, when, in 
which sequence; and also in analysing the public finance situation of the LGUs 
candidates to amalgamation and the prospects in case of amalgamation. The technical 
support can be full (the cantonal department of municipal affair takes the technical 
leads) or takes the form of ad hoc contribution in the process (normally the communes 
will outsource the study).  
 
(3) Direct unconditional block grants paid to the new amalgamated commune. This is 
usually the main cantonal policy incentive. There are two ways for calculating the  
cantonal financial aid: ad hoc in five cantons (Aargau, Graubünden, Luzern, Sankt-Gall 
and Ticino); formula based (all the other cantons). 
 
Ad hoc financial support 
Ad hoc financial support means that there are variables enumerated in the cantonal 
law on the encouragement to LGUs amalgamation which needs calculations or 
estimations (normally by the canton) to obtain the amount to be paid.  
 
The incitation consist in (i) calculating the financial and structural disabilities which 
exist between the poorest or the less developed LGU in the amalgamation and a 
benchmark detailed in the law and (ii) compensate for the differences. Usual 
benchmarks are either the variable average for the LGUs engaged in the amalgamation 
or the “best” position for each variable. It is never some sort of “cantonal average” for 
                                                     
10
 Details of the study can be obtained with the author. The same method was applied for the cantons of 
Vaud, Jura and Ticino. See Table 3 above.  
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the relevant variables. Thus the financial aid is relative to the group of LGUs candidates 
for amalgamation within a delimited territory.  
 
The most common variables are: 
- public indebtedness per capita; 
- tax effort (considering the surtax on direct taxation, sometimes also user charges); 
- differences in the infrastructures and equipment of the communes; 
- exceptional needs, considering that certain investment are necessary  for the viability 
of the new commune, which costs cannot be left to the new LGU after amalgamation. 
 
The basic hypothesis is that despite all economic or democratic arguments for 
amalgamation, disparities in the financial position of the candidate LGUs can be an 
obstacle to amalgamation. No voter will happily accept a higher tax burden in order to 
“bail out” neighbouring communes in the process.   
 
The cantons have an interest in the success of amalgamation: the re-assignment of 
functions can be eased; the LGUs’ balanced budget constraint is more easily respected; 
risk-sharing through a larger local tax base increases fiscal sustainability; the necessity 
of an equalization policy is reduced. 
  
Formula based 
Formula base incentive grants can be expressed with the following general formula: 
 
 
IG   incentive grant 
CHF  the amount of grant per capita 
H   the number of residents 
i   for LGU candidate to amalgamation 
n   the number of LGUs in the referred amalgamation 
IFC  indicator of financial capacity 
m   encouragement factor that increases  with n 
 
Most cantonal formulas are lump sum and use only the two first terms within *…+ in 
the equation above. Actually, the amount per capita varies from 100 to 600 CHF (see 
Table 9). Multiplied by the number of resident, it simply means that the relative 
disabilities of the LGUs engaged in amalgamation are not taken into consideration. This 
implies homogeneity of the financial and structural positions of the LGUs engaged in 
the process of amalgamation. If not, large non-compensated disparities would most 
certainly conduce to negative votes in the better-off LGUs. 
 
Table 9    Amounts of financial  incentives in selected cantons 
Canton Solothurn Vaud Fribourg Neuchâtel Bern Jura Valais 
Per capita amount in CHF 100 250 400 400 400 500 600 
Year of implementation 2005 2004 1999 2003 2004 2004 2005 
Number of (-) LGUs (from 
the following year to 2011) 
-4 -6 -75 -9 -15 -19 -8 
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Three cantons (Neuchâtel and Jura, Fribourg between 2000 and 2005) are weighting 
the population number with an inverse index of a financial (tax) capacity. Tax capacity 
indices are generally used in revenue equalization. The assertion, in the formula, is 
that “rich” LGUs participating into the amalgamation process should not receive the 
full per capita incentive grant because their financial position is already confortable. 
This variable has been debated in many cantons and abandoned because it mixes 
equalization with the amalgamation policy, something which goes against the 
Tinbergen “one goal on instrument” rule in policy implementation.11 It could also 
induce wealthier LGUs not to engage in amalgamation because the aid received is 
judged insufficient.  
 
Finally, the variable m tries to influence the size of the new LGU in increasing the per 
capita grant in function of the number of communes finally merged. Here the incentive 
from the cantonal point of view is to obtain in each amalgamation the number of LGUs 
according to the concept of “noyaux forts”– a situation which is not yet realised (see 
Table 3, last column right). The m values are: 
 
n 1 2 3 4 5 …  
m 1 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 + 0.1 Berne, Fribourg, Vaud 
m 1 1 1.25 1.50 1.75  +0.25 Valais 
The advantage of the formula based incentive grant is that it is transparent from the 
outset and not negotiable. The canton has no room of manoeuvre; but it is easy to 
manage. The hidden inconvenient is that it does not take into consideration LGUs’ 
disabilities in the  amalgamation process. Whatever the formula is, wealthier LGUs can 
always calculate the amount that would be necessary to compensate financial 
disabilities: comparing debt per capita, the surtax on direct taxation or the 
performance of the user-pays and polluter-pays principles in specific environmental 
functions is not too difficult. Measuring differences in the infrastructure equipment is 
more intricate. But, suppose this calculation is possible: if [ ∑ disabilities > IGN ] then 
the risk is high that taxpayers and voters in the richer LGUs will not accept the 
amalgamation.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
What can be concluded from the Swiss debate and practices in LGUs amalgamation 
cantonal policies?  
 The policy path does only and very partially coincide with the textbook fiscal 
federalism arguments on the optimal size of “government” (which are in fact 
“service precinct”). 
 Voluntary LGUs’ amalgamation is feasible, but need guidance and strong 
commitment from the higher government layer. 
 An explicit policy programme is necessary, with the indication of the relevant 
variables which are important for the canton and for the LGUs. These variables are 
not only economic, but also institutional, and democratic. 
                                                     
11
 According to Tinbergen, the number of achievable policy goals cannot exceed the number of policy 
instruments. This is nowadays known as the Tinbergen Rule.  Tinbergen J., 1952, On the Theory of 
Economic Policy, Amsterdam: North Holland, 2nd edition. 
The inverse argument can also be found: equalization objectives can be so generous that there is no 
incentive for beneficiary LGUs to find efficient solutions in horizontal cooperation or amalgamation. 
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 There needs to be a proposal with a tentative new territorial design after 
implementation of the policy agenda mentioned above. 
 A large consultation of local actors about the canton’s proposals must be 
organised. Local stakeholders have to appropriate the policy proposals since the 
final decision belongs to the local level. 
 Cantonal technical and financial support for and during the process of 
amalgamation would be opportune. 
 Financial incentive in the form of unconditional block grant should be paid to the 
amalgamated units in order to compensate (partly) LGUs’ relative disabilities. 
Calculation criteria must be explicit, fixed in the law and known in advance. 
 
Finally, one last word is needed on measuring the performance of the cantonal 
amalgamation policies. In my experience, this is impossible mission. There are a 
number of reasons. First, for the moment (but further research on this theme is 
pursued), it is not possible to establish a significant and robust relation between the 
per capita amount of the cantonal aids and the number of amalgamation (see Table 9).  
 
The second argument is that if the mains reasons for amalgamation are related to the 
recovery of participative democracy at the grass roots level and a regain of LGUs 
autonomy, the measure of the performance becomes highly subjective and 
controversial. It can be evaluated through surveys and questionnaires, but who will be 
questioned: residents, voters, beneficiaries, taxpayers, the electorate, elected 
members of local parliament, elected executive members, administrative personal? 
Existing surveys of this sort show as large and disparate answers as possible. How do 
we measure “voice” and political autonomy, or simply financial autonomy (Blöchliger 
and King, 2006; Dafflon and Madies, 2009: 61-69)? The only undisputable quantitative 
answer would be to count how many horizontal inter-communal cooperation contracts 
and arrangements would be internalised after amalgamation.  
 
Economic objectives (economies of scale, productive efficiency, spillovers, congestion 
costs) would be difficult to measure because the other environmental variables are 
dominant. In the Swiss case, since the mid 1990ies there has been a number of re-
assignment of functions between cantons and the communes; since 2008, this has 
been exacerbated through a domino effect by the re-assignment of function between 
the federal layer and the cantons. Also expenditure data would not give the answer 
since in most cantons, equalization contributions and payments based on expenditure 
needs modify the communal outlays: one would have to clean expenditure data from 
the equalising component in order to trace the real expenditures based on causality 
and, thus, construct the production functions – the only way to trace efficiency 
variation in production and delivery of the local public services. In so doing, beside the 
technical problems, it would be difficult to isolate the incidence due to amalgamation 
alone.  Analogous reasoning can be proposed on the tax side. Amalgamation as such 
does not increase the tax base: in the new LGUs it will be the sheer addition of 
previous LGUs’ tax base. The argument is that the enlarge tax base somehow reduces 
the risk of economic downturns on the tax yield: but this depends on the distribution 
of the tax bases in the different economic activities and cannot be assessed in general. 
Again, the only firm calculation which can be proposed in the budgetary context is to 
assess the possible economies in regrouping several communal administrative units in 
one because it reduces the administrative costs of cooperation units that are 
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internalised in the new LGU with amalgamation. This is not an easy task if the 
amalgamation gives at the same time an opportunity to increase the technical capacity 
and abilities of the new LGU’s bureaux.  
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